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What Do the Studies of Judicial Review of Agency Actions Mean?
Richard J. Pierce, Jr. 1
Over the past twenty years, scholars have published numerous empirical studies
of the patterns of decisions of reviewing courts. 2 Each of the studies subjected to
statistical analysis large numbers of decisions in which courts at all levels of the judiciary
have applied six administrative law doctrines to a wide variety of agency decisions. In
this article, I will summarize the findings of ten of those studies and attempt to explain
what they mean to lawyers, judges, teachers, and scholars.
In section one, I describe the six doctrines. In section two, I summarize the
findings of the studies, and address the question: how much does doctrine matter? In
section three, I address the question: what other factors can explain the patterns of
decisions? I focus particular attention on two variables that many scholars have studied –
the political or ideological preferences of the judges, and the composition of panels of
circuit court judges. In section four, I address the question: is the D.C. Circuit different,
and if so, why? In section five, I address the question: what do these studies mean for
lawyers, judges, teachers and scholars?
I. The Six Doctrines
The doctrine that has been studied the most was announced in the Supreme
Court’s 1984 opinion in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council:
When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which it administers, it is confronted
with two questions. First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the
precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the
court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.
If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue,
the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the
absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with
respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a
permissible construction of the statute. 3
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David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 Va. L. Rev. 2317 (2010); Thomas Miles & Cass Sunstein, The
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In other parts of its opinion, the Court equated “permissible” with “reasonable.” 4
Some scholars argue that only the second part of the Chevron test is important. 5
They maintain that the first part of the test has no independent meaning because any
agency construction of a statute that is inconsistent with congressional intent is, by
definition, unreasonable. In this view, the Chevron doctrine can be simplified and
restated as: a reviewing court must uphold any reasonable agency construction of an
agency-administered statute.
Between 1984 and 2000, the Chevron doctrine dominated judicial review of
agency statutory interpretations. Before 1984, the doctrine the Court applied most
frequently in reviewing agency statutory interpretations was announced in the Court’s
1944 opinion in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.:
We consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the Administrator under
this Act, while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do
constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants
may properly resort for guidance. The weight of such a judgment in a particular case
will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its
reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors
which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control. 6

The Skidmore doctrine largely disappeared between 1984 and 2000. Most
scholars and judges believed that it had been displaced by the Chevron doctrine. In 2001,
however, a majority of the Court resurrected the Skidmore doctrine and held that it, rather
than the Chevron doctrine, applies to some uncertain category of cases. 7 Since 2001, the
Justices have engaged in a lively debate about the circumstances in which each of the two
competing doctrines applies. 8 That debate indicates that all Justices believe that the
doctrines differ and that the Chevron doctrine is more deferential than the Skidmore
doctrine.
The third doctrine that has been studied was announced in the Court’s 1983
opinion in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers’ Association v. State Farm Automobile
Insurance Co.:
Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency has relied
on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider
an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs
counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be
ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise. 9
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The State Farm doctrine is often described as imposing a duty to engage in reasoned
decision making, i.e., a court will uphold an agency action if, but only if, the agency
adequately explains how it reasoned from the language of the relevant statute and the
available evidence to the conclusions it reached. 10 The State Farm doctrine is based on
the Court’s interpretation of the arbitrary and capricious standard of review. The
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) instructs reviewing courts to apply that standard to
all agency actions. 11
There is broad agreement that the Chevron and State Farm doctrines overlap, but
there is disagreement with respect to the extent of the overlap between the two. 12 Some
scholars believe that step two of Chevron is the same as the duty to engage in reasoned
decision making announced in State Farm, i.e., a statutory interpretation is “reasonable”
within the meaning of Chevron step two if, but only if, the agency adequately explained
why it adopted that interpretation. It follows that a scholar who believes that step two of
Chevron renders step one irrelevant by subsuming that step sees a complete overlap
between the two doctrines.
The fourth doctrine that has been studied is the substantial evidence doctrine. It
was originally announced by the Court in its 1938 opinion in Consolidated Edison Co. v.
NLRB and was qualified by the Court’s 1951 opinion in Universal Camera v. NLRB.
Combining the critical passages from the two opinions, the Court defined the doctrine to
require: “[S]uch relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion, . . .” 13 “tak[ing] into account whatever [evidence] in the record
detracts from its weight.” 14
In its original form, the substantial evidence doctrine had a narrower role than the
first three doctrines. It applied only to agency findings of fact made in formal
adjudications. Gradually, however, it has taken on a broader meaning. The transformation
of the substantial evidence test into a broad doctrine of judicial review has taken place
through three mechanisms. First, while the APA instructs reviewing courts to apply the
substantial evidence standard only to findings of fact made in formal adjudications, 15
modern agencies use informal adjudication and informal rulemaking to “find” the facts
that are the predicates for their actions in a high proportion of cases. 16 As a technical
matter, an agency is not required to make findings of fact when it acts through informal
adjudication or informal rulemaking, but courts require agencies to identify the factual
predicates for their actions in both contexts. 17 Reviewing courts also require agencies to
10

For detailed discussion of State Farm, see Richard Pierce, I Administrative Law Treatise §7.4 (5th ed.
2010).
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For discussion of this debate, see Pierce supra. note 10, at pages 218-21.
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305 U.S. 197, 2291938).
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340 U.S. 474, 488(1951).
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See generally Pierce, supra. note 10, at chapters 7 and 8.
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discusses the relationship between the available evidence and the factual predicates for its action. See State
Farm, 463 U.S. 29. If a party petitions for review of an agency decision taken in an informal adjudication,
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explain why they have chosen the factual predicates on which they rely. Since the APA
does not authorize a court to apply the substantial evidence standard for this purpose,
courts usually use the ubiquitous arbitrary and capricious standard for that purpose. Thus,
courts regularly refer to the choice between arbitrary and capricious review and
substantial evidence review as a choice between doctrines that perform the same
functions. 18
Second, while the APA authorizes courts to apply the substantial evidence
standard only to findings of fact made in formal adjudications, some important agencyspecific statutes require courts to apply that standard to all actions agencies take to
implement the statute, including informal adjudications and informal rulemakings. 19 That
congressional instruction to courts to apply the substantial evidence standard to all
agency actions and not just to formal adjudications has forced courts to adapt the doctrine
to the quite different contexts of informal adjudication and informal rulemaking. 20 In
those contexts, agencies are not required to make formal findings of fact based on
“evidence’ of the type courts usually consider in “hearings” of the type familiar to courts.
The “evidence” on which the agency relies in informal adjudications and rulemakings
usually consists of scientific and economic studies contained in a “record” that consists
solely of written submissions to the agency. As a result, the version of the substantial
evidence doctrine courts apply in such cases is virtually identical to the version of the
arbitrary and capricious standard that was the basis for the Court’s opinion in State Farm.
A court can apply the substantial evidence doctrine to uphold an agency action taken
through use of informal adjudication or informal rulemaking only by determining
whether the agency engaged in reasoned decision making, including a statement of the
agency’s reasons in support of the factual predicates for its action.
Third, even in the original context of judicial review of findings of fact made in
formal adjudications, courts now combine the substantial evidence standard with the
duty to engage in reasoned decision making announced in State Farm. Thus, courts
often apply the substantial evidence doctrine as the basis to reject an agency finding
because the agency has not stated adequate reasons for crediting some evidence and
discrediting other evidence. 21 As one circuit court described the modern version of the
substantial evidence doctrine in 2007, an agency “must give specific, cogent reasons for
[its] findings” in the common situation in which there is conflicting evidence in the
record. 22

the reviewing court requires the agency to provide a statement of its reasons for acting that includes a
discussion of the relationship between the available evidence and the factual predicates for the agency
action. See LTV Corp. v. PBGC, 496 U.S. 633, 654-55(1990).
18
E.g., Bangor Hydro-Electric C. v. FERC, 78 F.3d 659,663 n.3(D.C. Cir. 1996).
19
E.g., 15 U.S.C. §717r.
20
Initially, courts found this task difficult. See, e.g., Industrial Union Dep’t v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d
467,469(D.C. Cir. 1974). Over time, however, they became comfortable with the process. E.g., American
Public Gas Ass’n v. FPC, 567 F.2d 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
21
See cases described in Pierce, supra. note 10, at pages 988-89, 997-99.
22
Chen. v. Mukasey, 510 F.3d 797, 801-02 (8th Cir. 2007).
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The Supreme Court has recognized that the substantial evidence standard and the
arbitrary and capricious standard perform analogous functions today. 23 The Court also
has characterized the substantial evidence standard as more demanding than the arbitrary
and capricious standard. 24 Circuit courts and scholars have expressed skepticism that the
two doctrines actually differ, however. 25 Even the Supreme Court has recognized that the
doctrines rarely, if ever, yield different results. 26
The fifth doctrine that has been the subject of empirical studies had its origin in
the Supreme Court’s 1945 opinion in Bowles v. Seminole Rock 27 though the Court now
refers to it by reference to its 1997 opinion in Auer v. Robbins:
Since this involves an interpretation of an administrative regulation a court must
necessarily look to the administrative construction of the regulation if the meaning of
the words is in doubt. The intention of Congress or the principles of the Constitution
in some situations may be relevant in the first instance in choosing between various
constructions. But the ultimate criterion is the administrative interpretation, which
becomes of controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
regulation.… 28

The Auer doctrine performs the same function as the prior four doctrines
except that it applies to agency interpretations of rules rather than to agency
interpretations of statutes. Of course, a court must apply both the Auer doctrine
and one or more of the other doctrines in the common situation in which the
agency supports its action based on both an interpretation of a statute and an
interpretation of a rule. 29
The sixth doctrine is de novo review. It differs significantly from the other five, at
least in theory. Each of the other five doctrines instructs a reviewing court to confer some
uncertain degree of deference on the agency decision the court is reviewing. As the name
suggests, de novo review refers to an approach to judicial review in which the court does
not confer any deference on the agency; it resolves the issue before it as if the agency had
never addressed the issue. 30
II. The Findings of the Studies: Does Doctrine Matter?
Most of the studies analyzed patterns of decisions by circuit courts, but two
analyzed Supreme Court opinions and one analyzed district court decisions. Bill Eskridge
and Lauren Baer analyzed 1014 Supreme Court opinions issued between 1984 and
2005. 31 They found that the overall affirmance rate was 68.3%. 32 Disaggregating the
23

Dickenson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 162-62 (1999).
E.g., American Paper Institute v. American Electric Power Service Corp. 461 U.S. 402, 412 n.7 (1983).
25
See cases discussed in Pierce, supra. note 10, at pages 1020-21.
26
Dickenson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. at 162-63.
27
325 U.S. 410,414 (1945).
28
519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997).
29
E.g., Shipbuilders Council v. Coast guard, 578 F.3d 234 (4th Cir. 2009).
30
Verkuil, supra. note 2, at 688.
31
Eskridge & Baer, supra. note 2, at 1094..
24
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cases by doctrine, they found the following affirmance rates: Chevron, 76.2%; Skidmore,
73.5%; Auer, 90.9%; and, de novo, 66.0%. 33 The only other study of Supreme Court
decisions was published by Miles & Sunstein in 2006. 34 They analyzed the sixty-nine
Supreme Court opinions issued between 1989 and 2005 in which the Supreme Court
invoked the Chevron doctrine. 35 They found that the Court affirmed 67% of agency
actions, 36 an affirmance rate approximately 9 per cent lower than the rate Eskridge &
Baer found for the period 1984 to 2005. Since the period studied by Miles and Sunstein
overlaps almost completely with the last fifteen years of the period studied by Eskridge
and Baer, the lower affirmance rate found by Miles and Sunstein implies a decline in the
Supreme Court’s rate of affirmance in Chevron cases after 1990.
Most of the studies analyzed circuit court decisions. Several studies reported rates
of affirmance in circuit courts when they apply the Chevron doctrine. The findings are
81.3% in 1985, 37 75.5% in 1988, 38 65.2% in 1991-1995, 39 73% in 1995-1996, 40 and 64%
in 1996-2006. 41 The findings are in a narrow range: 64 to 81.3% and do not indicate any
trend toward more of less deference over time.
The studies included several findings with respect to the rate of affirmance when
courts apply the Skidmore doctrine. They are: 55.1% in 1965, 42 60.6 % in 1975, 43 70.9%
in 1984, 44 and 60.4% in 2001-2005. 45 Again, the range of findings is narrow – 55.1 to
70.9% and they do not indicate a clear trend toward more or less deference over time.
Two studies included findings with respect to the affirmance rate when courts
apply the substantial evidence doctrine and one included a finding with respect to the rate
of affirmance when courts apply the State Farm doctrine. The findings are: State Farm
64% in 1996-2006, 46 substantial evidence 64% in 1996-2006 47 and 71.2% in 20002004. 48 The range of findings for the State Farm and substantial evidence doctrines is
even narrower than the ranges of findings applicable to the Chevron and Skidmore
doctrines – 64 to 71.2%--and again the findings do not show any clear temporal trend.

32

Id. at 1100.
Id. at 1142.
34
Miles & Sunstein I.
35
Id. at 825.
36
Id. at 849.
37
Schuck & Elliott, supra. note 2, at 1038.
38
Id. at 1038.
39
Cross & Tiller, supra. note 2, at 2169.
40
Kerr, supra. note 2, at 30.
41
Miles & Sunstein II at 849.
42
Schuck & Elliott, supra. note 2, at 1007.
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Id. at 1007-08.
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Id. at 1030.
45
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I have found only one empirical study of district court review of agency decisions.
Paul Verkuil studied district court decisions that applied the substantial evidence doctrine
to Social Security disability decisions and district court decisions that engaged in de novo
review of agency denials of requests for information under the Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA). 49 He found that district courts affirmed disability decisions in only 50% of
cases, while they affirmed agency decisions under FOIA in 90% of cases. 50 Those
findings differed dramatically both from the findings in the studies of Supreme Court
decisions and circuit court decisions and from the pattern of decisions Verkuil
hypothesized based on the highly deferential nature of the substantial evidence doctrine
and the non-deferential nature of de novo review. 51
With one notable exception, the studies suggest that a court’s choice of which
doctrine to apply in reviewing an agency action is not an important determinant of
outcomes in the Supreme Court or the circuit courts. The ranges of affirmance rates by
doctrine are: Chevron – 60-81.3%, Skidmore -- 55.1-73.5%, State Farm—64%,
substantial evidence—64-71.2%, de novo—66%. All of the ranges of findings overlap
and doctrinally-based differences in outcome are barely detectable. The one notable
exception is the Auer doctrine. The Supreme Court affirms agency interpretations of
agency rules at a much higher rate – 90%--than the roughly 70% rate at which it upholds
other agency decisions. 52 There are no studies of circuit court decisions that apply Auer,
but the Supreme Court seems to be sending the lower courts an unmistakable if implicit
message that they should confer extraordinary deference on agency interpretations of
agency rules.
The unusually high rate at which the Court affirms agency interpretations of
agency rules suggests strongly that the Court has rejected John Manning’s sophisticated
argument against judicial deference to agency interpretations of agency rules.53 The
Court seems instead to have internalized the traditional common sense reasons in support
of such deference—agencies are in a much better position than courts to know what their
rules mean and to understand the functional implications of alternative interpretations of
their rules.
The contrast between the findings of the studies of Supreme Court and circuit
court decisions, on one hand, and the findings in Verkuil’s study of district court
decisions, on the other, adds credence to Verkuil’s interpretation of his findings. Verkuil
argued that the stark disparity between the results he hypothesized and the results he
found suggested the need to study in greater detail the two decision making contexts in an
effort to identify and to address the institutional flaws that led to such anomalous
results. 54 The studies of Supreme Court and circuit court decision making indicate that
the norm for the results of judicial review of agency decisions is about a 70% affirmance
49

Verkuil, supra. note 2.
Id. at 719.
51
Id. at 719.
52
Eskridge & Baer, supra. note 2, at 1142.
53
John Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency
Rules, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 612 (1996).
54
Verkuil, supra. note 2, at 724-33.
50
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rate. Any study that finds an affirmance rate that varies significantly from that norm in
some context suggests the need for detailed study of the decision making context to
identify and to address the causes of the variation from the norm.
While the studies demonstrate that a court’s choice among the six doctrines has
little if any explanatory value, it does not follow that doctrine is irrelevant to the decision
making process if we conceive of doctrine more broadly. In the final section of this essay
I argue that five of the six doctrines courts apply are just alternative ways of stating the
same broad doctrine – a court should uphold a reasonable agency action. If we conceive
of doctrine in that broader way and ignore the subtle differences in the Court’s
description of the doctrines, the studies provide no direct evidence with respect to the
explanatory value of doctrine. Through a process of differential diagnosis, however, the
studies allow us to infer that doctrine is by far the most dominant explanatory variable if
we conceive of doctrine in this much broader way.
What Factors Can Explain the Patterns of Decisions?
If choice of doctrine explains little if any of the variation in the outcome of cases
in which courts review agency actions, it would be helpful to know what other factors
help to explain the pattern of decisions. The studies have identified five other variables
that may help to explain outcomes – procedures used to produce the agency decision,
agency consistency over time, extent of judicial comfort with the subject matter of the
agency decision, ideological perspectives of the judges and Justices, and panel effect, i.e.,
whether a circuit court panel consists of three judges of the same political party or of a
mixture of judges of different political parties.
The findings with respect to an agency’s choice of decision making procedures
suggest that this factor has little, if any, effect on the rate of judicial affirmance of agency
actions. Eskridge and Baer found that the Supreme Court upholds agency actions taken
through use of notice and comment rulemaking in 72.5% of cases versus 65.4% for
actions taken through formal adjudication.55 That difference is modest, however, and its
significance is called into question by some of Eskridge and Baer’s other findings, e.g.,
the Court upholds agency positions taken in amicus briefs and in various informal
documents at a rate higher than the rate at which the court upholds positions taken in
legislative rules or formal adjudications. 56 Moreover, Elliott and Schuck found that
circuit courts uphold agency adjudications more frequently than agency rules, 57 while
Kerr found no difference in the rate of affirmance of rules and adjudications. 58
Several studies found that the rate of affirmance is higher with respect to
longstanding agency positions than for newly adopted agency positions. 59 The
55

Eskridge & Baer, supra. note 2, at 1147.
Id. at 1148.
57
Schuck & Elliott, supra. note 2, at 1021-22.
58
Kerr, supra. note 2, at 30.
59
E.g., Eskridge & Baer, supra. note 2, at 1148-49; Hickman & Krueger, supra. note 2, at 1286-87; Kerr,
supra. note 2, at 33.
56
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differences were small, however. Those findings are consistent with applicable doctrine.
The Court has long said that an agency can depart from precedent or change its policy if,
but only, if the agency acknowledges and explains the change. 60 That aspect of applicable
doctrine suggests a pattern of decisions like that found in the studies—courts uphold
longstanding agency positions only slightly more often than they uphold newly adopted
positions.
Several studies found differences in affirmance rates depending on the substantive
context of the agency decision. Thus, for instance, Eskridge and Baer found that the
Supreme Court affirms agency decisions involving bankruptcy or business regulation in
75 to 77% of cases but that it affirms decisions involving criminal law or labor law in
only 62 to 65% of cases. 61 This difference also fits reasonably well with applicable
doctrine. The Court has long emphasized comparative institutional advantage and
specialized agency expertise as bases for its deference doctrines. 62 It is not surprising that
it attaches less significance to an agency’s comparative advantage when the agency is
addressing a subject like labor law or criminal law that is relatively familiar to the
Justices, than when the agency is addressing a subject like bankruptcy or business
regulation where the agency has a distinct expertise advantage over the Justices.
Comparative institutional advantage may explain some of the other findings of
differences in affirmance rates based on subject matter as well. Thus, for instance, Zaring
found that the D.C. Circuit affirms agencies that appear before it frequently 12% less
often than agencies that appear before it less frequently.63 It is not surprising to learn that
a court gains confidence in its ability to understand a subject as it gains experience in
addressing the subject.
Many studies found that the ideological preferences of judges and Justices have
considerable explanatory power in the context of judicial review of agency actions. 64 The
findings with respect to the voting patterns of the two former administrative law
professors who are now Justices are illustrative. Eskridge and Baer found that Justice
Breyer votes to uphold 79.5% of liberal agency actions, while Justice Scalia votes to
uphold only 53.8% of liberal agency actions. 65 That 25.7% difference suggests strongly
that the ideological preferences of the Justices are far more important than any of the
other factors that have been studied in explaining their votes in cases in which the Court
reviews agency actions.

60

See, e.g., FCC v. Fox Television Stations, 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009)(agency need only assert its belief that
new policy is better than old policy to have new policy upheld); INS v. Yang, 519 U.S. 26,32 (1996) (court
will overturn an unexplained departure from precedent). See generally Pierce, II Administrative Law
Treatise §11.5.
61
Eskridge & Baer, supra. note 2, at 1144.
62
E.g., Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. NRDC, 462 U.S. 97, 103 (1983).
63
Zaring, supra. note 2, at 2366. See also Miles & Sunstein II at 796-97 (finding that courts that review an
agency more frequently uphold the actions of that agency less frequently).
64
Zaring was the only scholar who looked at this question and did not find a significant difference in voting
patterns based on the ideological preference of judges. Zaring , supra. note 2, at 2362-64.
65
Eskridge & Baer, supra. note 2, at 1154.
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Eskridge and Baer found a smaller disparity between the votes of Justices Breyer
and Scalia when the Court reviews conservative agency actions. Justice Scalia votes to
uphold such actions in 71.6% of cases, while Justice Breyer votes to uphold them in
64.9% of cases – a difference of only 6.7%. 66 The difference between those two voting
patterns reflects another robust finding in the studies. Liberal judges and Justices vote to
uphold agency actions more often than do conservative judges and Justices. 67 This
finding also illustrates the insignificance of doctrine. Justice Scalia is the most outspoken
proponent of the highly deferential Chevron doctrine, 68 while Justice Breyer is the most
vocal critic of that doctrine. 69 Yet, Justice Breyer’s voting pattern shows that he is more
deferential than Justice Scalia. Justice Breyer votes to uphold agency actions more often
than any other Justice, while Justice Scalia votes to uphold agency actions less often than
any other Justice. 70
Every study of circuit court decisions that has looked at the question has found
that ideological preferences help to explain patterns of decisions in cases in which courts
review agency actions. Most studies found large ideologically-based differences in
outcomes. Remarkably, three of the studies had identical findings with respect to the
explanatory power of the ideological preferences of judges. Each of the three found that a
circuit court panel was 31% more likely to uphold an agency action when the action was
consistent with the ideological preferences of the members of the panel than when the
action was inconsistent with those preferences. 71 Thus, ideology is by far the most
important of the explanatory variables that have been studied.
Many studies also analyzed the patterns of decisions in an effort to detect a panel
effect, i.e., a difference in patterns of decisions that varies depending on whether a panel
consists of three judges of the same political party or instead consists of two judges of
one party and one judge of the other party. Every study found large panel effects. Again,
three of the studies included remarkably consistent findings with respect to panel effects.
The tendency of circuit judges to vote in a manner consistent with their ideological
preferences is about half as strong when judges sit in politically mixed panels as when
they sit in politically unified panels. 72
Scholars have identified two plausible reasons for the panel effect. It may be
attributable to a whistle-blower effect, i.e., the members of the majority party are deterred
from voting in accordance with their ideological preferences by fear that their colleague
66

Id. at 1154.
E.g., Miles & Sunstein I, at 855; Miles & Sunstein II, at 796.
68
See Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 Duke L. J. 511
(1989) (praising Chevron).
69
See Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 Admin. L. Rev. 363
(1986)(criticizing Chevron).
70
Eskridge & Baer, supra. note 2, at 1154; Miles & Sunstein I at 826.
71
Miles & Sunstein I, at 856; Miles & Sunstein II, at 789-90; Cross & Tiller, supra. note 2, at 2171. See
also Kerr, supra. note 2, at 40 (finding a 20% differential based on ideology); Revesz, supra. note 2 (finding
large ideologically-based differences in every time period studied). But see Zaring, supra. note 2, at 236264 (finding only small ideologically-based differences).
72
Miles & Sunstein I, at 856; Miles & Sunstein II, at 789-90; Cross & Tiller, supra. note 2, at 856.
67
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of the other party will write a scorching dissent that will embarrass them. 73 Alternatively,
it may be attributable to the effects of collegiality, i.e., when judges with differing
ideological preferences are forced to discuss their differences they tend to temper their
views. 74
I suspect that the panel effect is caused by some combination of both factors.
Whatever may be its cause, the effect seems to disappear when the number of decision
makers increases from three to nine. Ideology is about as important a determinant of the
decisions of the Justices as it is of circuit court judges even though the nine Justices differ
significantly with respect to their ideological preferences and the majority can be certain
that its opinion will elicit a highly critical dissent in every case that has significant
ideological content. 75
IV. Is the D.C. Circuit Different?
Every study that has looked at the question has found that the D.C. Circuit is less
deferential to agencies than any other circuit. That robust finding is important because the
D.C. Circuit decides far more cases involving judicial review of agency action than any
other circuit. The D.C. Circuit decides over one-quarter of cases in which circuit courts
review agency actions. 76 Like many of the other findings in the studies, the findings with
respect to the D.C. Circuit’s affirmance rate are remarkably consistent. Schuck and Elliott
found that the D.C. Circuit affirmed agencies in 12% fewer cases than other circuits in
1984, 77 while Miles and Sunstein found that the D.C. Circuit affirmed agencies in 11%
fewer cases than other circuits during the period 1996 to 2006.
There are at least four plausible explanations for the D.C. Circuit’s consistently
less deferential posture in cases in which it reviews agency actions. First, it might be
attributable to the D.C. Circuit’s greater familiarity with the subject matter of many of the
administrative law cases it decides. A regional circuit court might decide one case
involving telecommunications law every few years, for instance, while the D.C. Circuit
typically decides several such cases each year. Over time, a judge who is regularly
exposed to a body of law may come to believe that he does not suffer from a significant
institutional disadvantage vis a vis the agency charged with responsibility to implement
that body of law. The judge may come to believe that he need not defer to the agency
because he knows as much about the subject as do the agency decision makers. This
explanation for the D.C. Circuit’s less deferential posture fits well with the finding that
circuit courts have lower affirmance rates with respect to agencies they review frequently
than with respect to agencies they review infrequently and with the finding that the
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Supreme Court affirms agencies less frequently in substantive contexts in which the
Justices believe that they are not at a comparative institutional disadvantage. 78
Second, the D.C. Circuit’s less deferential posture may be attributable to the
composition of the court. The process of appointing judges to the D.C. Circuit differs
markedly from the process of appointing judges to the regional circuit courts. In
nominating people to be members of regional circuit courts, the President traditionally
defers to the preferences of the Senators and/or Governor of each state who are members
of the President’s party. Thus, for instance, when a Democrat President has the
opportunity to nominate someone to the “Maryland seat” on the Fourth Circuit, the
President traditionally solicits and acts on the recommendation of the senior (Democrat)
Senator from Maryland. The D.C. Circuit is one of only three courts to which the
President can make nominations of people of his own choosing. The process of
nominating people to the D.C. Circuit is dominated by the President’s political advisors.
This selection process may yield nominees with unusually powerful political and
ideological perspectives who are less likely to defer to the (often rival) politicians who
run agencies.
Third, the D.C. Circuit’s less deferential posture may be attributable to the
ambitions of many of the members of the D.C. Circuit. The President often chooses
members of the D.C. Circuit as nominees for the Supreme Court. Four of the members of
the current Supreme Court were members of the D.C. Circuit when they were nominated.
It may be that members of the D.C. Circuit believe that they can improve their chances of
being nominated to the Supreme Court by deciding high visibility cases in ways that
coincide with the ideological preferences of the leaders of their party.
Finally, the D.C. Circuit’s workload may contribute to its less deferential posture.
The D.C. Circuit decides less than one quarter of the average number of cases per judge
decided by the other circuit courts. 79 It takes a much longer time to read and understand
the record in a typical administrative law case than in a typical criminal law or contract
law case. Moreover, it takes much longer to write an opinion reversing an agency action
than an opinion affirming that action. The D.C. Circuit can devote much more time to
each case in which it reviews an agency action than can a regional circuit court. This
explanation for the D.C. Circuit’s greater willingness to overturn agency actions fits well
with the finding that the D.C. Circuit writes much longer opinions than other circuits in
such cases. 80
I believe that each of these four factors contributes to the D.C. Circuit’s unusually
low rate of upholding agency actions. My belief is reinforced by an explanation I once
heard from a friend who is a member of another circuit. As he described the process his
court often uses in deciding administrative law cases, he and his colleagues use Chevron
as a verb. Thus, for instance after a long day of hearing oral arguments in several cases,
one of which involved review of an agency action, the senior member of the panel would
78

See text at notes 61-63.
Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Judicial Business 2009 41 (2009).
80
Schuck & Elliott, supra. note 2, at 1004.
79

12

ask: “Should we Chevron that case?” In most administrative law cases, the other
members would respond affirmatively for several good reasons. The record in a typical
agency review case is extremely long. It often includes multiple scientific studies with
conflicting conclusions with respect to issues that are unfamiliar to the judges. Given
their heavy load of other cases, the judges can not devote nearly enough time to study of
the record and the issues to be confident that they understand the issues well enough to
pass judgment on the adequacy of the agency’s treatment of those issues. They fear that
they might cause more harm than good by attempting to grapple with the issues in a
serious way. Finally, they can dispose of the case with relatively little use of scarce
resources by instructing a clerk to write a short draft of an opinion in which he
summarizes the facts and issues, recites the applicable doctrines, and assures the reader
that the court has dutifully applied those doctrines and has detected no fatal flaws in the
agency’ decision making process. Of course, regional circuit courts overturn about onethird of the agency actions they review, so the judges must at least take a quick look at
factors like the relationship between the agency’s legal conclusions and the language of
the applicable statute and the quality of the agency’s reasoning before they Chevron a
case.
My friend went on to express the opinion that the members of the D.C. Circuit
can take a less deferential attitude toward such cases largely because of their much lower
caseload. Of course, he might have added that the members of the D.C. Circuit often can
obtain a decent understanding of the issues in less time than the members of a regional
circuit court because of their greater familiarity with the subject matter addressed in most
agency decisions.
I do not intend my stylized and necessarily hypothetical description of the
decision making process of either the regional circuit courts or the D.C. Circuit as a
criticism of either decision making process or of the judges who engage in either process.
If my description is accurate, it may well be that both institutions are doing about what
each should be doing given their quite different circumstances. What is clear, however, is
that the D.C. Circuit is systematically different from the other circuit courts in its
tendency to be less deferential to agencies. I leave until the last section of this essay, the
question of what, if anything, we should do about that tendency.
V. Implications of the Studies
A. Implications for practitioners
The findings of the studies have several implications for practitioners. First,
lawyers who play roles in administrative law cases should spend less time and energy
arguing about which doctrine a court should apply, e.g., whether an agency action is
subject to Chevron deference or Skidmore deference. There is no empirical support for
the widespread belief that choice of doctrine plays a major role in judicial review of
agency actions. I am not suggesting that lawyers ignore doctrine completely. There is
anecdotal evidence that a court’s choice of doctrine can be outcome determinative in a
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few otherwise close cases. 81 Moreover, courts expect to read briefs and listen to
arguments that include some discussion of applicable doctrine, and it is always a costly
mistake to fail to meet the expectations of an individual or an institution. It is a waste of
time and energy, however, to make a lengthy argument about the particular standard of
review the court should apply to an agency action.
Lawyers should focus their arguments instead on the common elements of the
doctrines, e.g., is the action consistent with the applicable statute and the available
evidence, and has the agency adequately explained the reasoning process it used?
Lawyers also should emphasize the consequences of the action under review, e.g., this
action will have the following [good or bad] consequences. Arguments of that type are
far more likely to influence a reviewing court than are arguments with respect to the
particular doctrine that a court should apply to an action.
Of course, it would be helpful to know the ideological preferences of the members
of the panel at the time the lawyer drafts a brief, since liberals are likely to find some
consequential arguments more persuasive than conservatives and vice versa. In most
cases, however, the lawyer will not know the composition of the panel until after briefs
are submitted. In that common situation, the briefs should include as many consequential
arguments as the record can support, preferably including some that are likely to appeal
to conservatives and some that are likely to appeal to liberals. That will create a situation
in which the lawyer can emphasize one or the other set of consequential arguments at oral
argument once he knows the composition of the panel.
The findings also suggest that lawyers should put a lot of thought into selection of
the forum in which to seek review of an agency action in the common situation in which
the petitioner can choose among several forums. Some courts have a high proportion of
liberal Democrats, while others have a high proportion of conservative Republicans. The
findings of the studies indicate that forum selection can be a powerful determinant of
outcome. Of course, ceteris parabis, the D.C. Circuit is a good choice for a petitioner,
since it consistently reverses agencies more often than any regional circuit court.
B. Implications for teachers
I have long struggled with the question of how I should treat this subject in my
administrative law course. I believe that it remains important that I devote considerable
class time to teaching doctrine because it is the vocabulary all lawyers must master to
communicate effectively with agencies, courts, and clients. I also believe, however, that
we owe our students a candid description of the role of doctrine. Thus,
I feel the need to tell my students about the studies that show that choice of doctrine is
not an important determinant of the outcome of administrative law disputes.
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I provide that candid description of the largely inconsequential role of choice of
doctrine with some regret, however. I fear that my students’ knowledge of the minor role
that choice of doctrine plays will discourage them from devoting time and energy to the
study of doctrine and will induce them to resent the amount of course time I devote to the
study of doctrine. I temper my description of the relatively minor role that is played by a
court’s choice of a particular doctrine with emphasis on the common elements of the
competing doctrines. No matter which doctrine a court applies, it invariably looks at three
factors in deciding whether to uphold or reject an agency action: (1) the relationship
between the agency action and the applicable statute; (2) the relationship between the
agency action and the available evidence; and, (3) the quality of reasoning the agency
used to explain its action.
I have even more ambivalence about telling my students about the studies that
have found that the ideological preferences of judges are an important determinant of the
outcome of many administrative law disputes. I fear that such a revelation will induce in
my students a cynical perspective that is not healthy for them either as young lawyers or
as citizens. I swallow hard and tell them about those findings as well, however, because I
believe that my overriding duty to them is to be honest in describing the realities of the
practice of administrative law. At a minimum, I will have provided them with
information that will allow them to decide whether they want to devote their careers to
this field, rather than to some other area of law that is less affected by politics.
I also temper my description of the findings with respect to the important role that
politics and ideology play in the decision making process by emphasizing the more
reassuring inferences we can draw from the studies. If, as the studies suggest, 26 to 31%
of the votes of judges and Justices can be explained as a function of the ideological
preferences of the judges and Justices, it follows that 69 to 74% of the votes of judges
and Justices are unaffected by their ideological preferences. Thus, it is fair to infer that in
over two-thirds of cases in which courts review agency actions, the court engages in a
politically and ideologically neutral decision making process in which it focuses on the
common elements of the competing doctrines: Is the action consistent with the applicable
statute? Is the action consistent with the available evidence? Has the agency explained
adequately why it took the action under review?
C. Implications for courts
The Supreme Court should respond to the robust finding that choice of doctrine is
not an important determinant of the outcome of a review proceeding by simplifying
review doctrine. I endorse David Zaring’s suggestion that the Supreme Court should
replace all six of the doctrines that it now applies with one simple doctrine – a reviewing
court must uphold any reasonable agency action. 82 The Court should recognize that it,
lower courts, lawyers, and scholars are wasting scarce time and energy tilting at
windmills by arguing about which doctrine applies to a particular agency action.
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Every study of the subject has found that choice of doctrine is not an important
determinant of the outcome of an administrative law dispute. Moreover, the doctrines are
not mutually inconsistent. The Court can, and should, acknowledge that each of the
existing doctrines is just a restatement of, and an elaboration on, Zaring’s proposed
universal test.
Thus, Chevron step one serves as a reminder that an agency interpretation of a
statute cannot be reasonable if it is inconsistent with clear legislative intent. It follows
that both agencies and reviewing courts must attempt to determine what Congress
intended when it included a particular provision in an agency-administered statute.
Similarly, the State Farm test is just a reminder that an agency must explain how it
reached a decision and that a court must review the agency’s reasoning process as part of
its task of deciding whether the agency action is reasonable. The Skidmore doctrine is a
similar reminder that courts should consider the thoroughness of the agency’s reasoning
process as part of the judicial task of deciding whether the agency’s action is reasonable.
The substantial evidence doctrine is just a reminder that one of the tasks of a reviewing
court is to look at the record of a proceeding to see whether the factual predicates for the
agency action bear some reasonable relationship to the available evidence. And, of
course, the Auer doctrine is simply a paraphrase of Zaring’s proposed test transposed to
the context of review of agency interpretations of agency rules.
That leaves only the de novo review doctrine. The Court should acknowledge that
the de novo review doctrine does not exist, and that it never has existed. It would make
no sense for a court to ignore completely an agency’s reasons for acting as it did, and I
doubt that any court has actually acted in that irrational matter. Once some other
institution of government has devoted time and energy to resolution of a dispute, no court
should ignore that institution’s reasons for resolving the dispute as it did. The studies are
consistent with common sense. Courts consider an agency’s reasoning for what it is
worth, whether or not Congress chooses to label the review process de novo. 83
I believe that adoption of Zaring’s proposal would respond adequately to
the finding that doctrine is not an important determinant of the outcome of a review
proceeding. I find it far more difficult to identify a promising response to the troubling
finding that the ideological preferences of judges and Justices are the most important
determinant of the outcome of review proceedings.
I once believed that the Court could reduce significantly the role of politics and
ideology in the process of judicial review of agency actions by announcing a more
objective and less malleable doctrine that all courts must apply. For years, I argued that
Chevron was such a doctrine. 84 For a while, I could point to studies that supported that
argument. The more recent studies do not support my prior view, however. Any
beneficial effect Chevron once had has now disappeared. I now share the view of many
scholars that courts will never announce a doctrine that cannot accommodate the
83
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powerful tendency of judges and Justices to act in ways that are consistent with their
strongly held political and ideological perspectives. 85
The findings with respect to the role of panel composition in the review process
tempts me to urge circuit courts to adopt a practice of assigning a politically mixed panel
to every review proceeding. The studies suggest that such a practice might cut in half the
explanatory power of the political and ideological views of judges in the review
process. 86 I am not prepared to make such a proposal at present, however. I fear that
adoption of such a practice might have unintended adverse effects that would more than
offset its beneficial effects. In particular, I fear that treating judges as members of a
political party might reinforce their tendency to think and act as members of a political
party.
I am troubled by the D.C. Circuit’s consistently less deferential posture in agency
review cases, particularly when I factor in the robust finding that a high proportion of
judicial decisions that reject agency actions are primarily driven by the ideological
preferences of the judges. It is not healthy for a handful of politically unaccountable
judges to make a high proportion of the nation’s policy decisions under the guise of
reviewing actions taken by politically accountable agencies. The only action I can
suggest that might have a beneficial effect on the D.C. Circuit’s approach to review
actions is one the Supreme Court has taken on many prior occasions – issuance of a
unanimous opinion in which the Court chastises the D.C. Circuit harshly for
misperceiving its role and overstepping the appropriate boundaries of judicial review. 87
There is little evidence that the D.C. Circuit has internalized that message when the Court
has sent it in strong language in the past, but I can think of no other means of trying to
keep the D.C. Circuit within permissible bounds.
D. Implications for Scholars
The studies have several implications for scholars. We should spend less time
engaging in meaningless debates about the alleged differences among the remarkably
similar judicial review doctrines and about the circumstances in which each should be
applied. We should focus instead on the three common elements of the doctrines –
consistency with applicable statutes, consistency with available evidence, and quality of
agency reasoning. We should also devote more attention to consequential arguments, e.g.,
if the [EPA or FCC] takes the following action, it will have the following [good or bad]
effects.
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Most importantly, we should put more time and effort into the kinds of empirical
studies I have discussed in this essay. Teachers, scholars, lawyers, agency heads, judges,
Justices, and legislators need to know what courts do and why. The language courts use
to describe what they do and why they do it is a useful starting point in that process, but
empirical studies can provide additional insights into judicial practices that can help all of
us gain a better understanding of the roles reviewing courts play in the administrative
state.
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